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ABSTRACT 
Conspiratorial thinking is widespread throughout the world, though the major 
social sciences have thus far chosen not to study it for a variety of reasons. This study 
attempts to understand what, in fact, makes individuals believe in conspiracy theories. 
Using aspects of terror management theory, Kruglanski’s (1989, 1990) theory of lay 
epistemology, participants’ political worldviews, and conspiracy type, this paper will 
explore what triggers conspiracy-prone individuals to see the world the way they do. It is 
anticipated that individuals who have thoughts of their death primed in their 
consciousness will structure the world more rigidly, cling to their worldviews and 
respond to information in a manner which will leave them susceptible to believing 
conspiracies. 
	  1 
	  
 
 
Background 
A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of an event in which conspiracy 
agents (i.e., people acting secretly in cohort) have a significant causal role.  Furthermore, 
the conspiracy postulated by the proposed explanation must be a conspiracy to bring 
about the historical event that it purports to explain.  This explanation must conflict with 
an “official” explanation of the same historical event (Coady, 2003).  The latter part of 
this definition helps rule out the possibility that an official explanation of the event can 
qualify as a conspiracy theory.  After all, there have been conspiracies that have officially 
been carried out.  The archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by a Serbian society 
called The Black Hand.  Abraham Lincoln was the victim of as assassination conspiracy.  
Watergate was a conspiracy and Richard Nixon was involved.  Pearl Harbor was a 
Japanese conspiracy.  September 11th was also a conspiracy – a conspiracy concocted by 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to attack the United States on its own soil. 
Academic research on the subject of conspiracy theories is scarce.  This could 
possibly be in response to the fact that belief in such theories is viewed upon as foolish 
and illogical (Melley, 2002; Shermer, 1997; Willman, 2002).  This view could very well 
stigmatize any attempt to study conspiratorial thinking in a scientific way.  It would 
certainly be a foolish endeavor to try and refute each and every conspiracy out there, 
especially considering how strange some of them are.  Perhaps the rants of someone like 
David Icke, who espouses his “Reptoid Hypothesis” which states that many of the 
2 
 
	  
world’s current and past leaders are in fact shape-shifting reptilian humanoids that 
created and control humanity, is seen as too outlandish in which to lend credence.  In 
fact, noted conspiracy theorist and talk radio host Alex Jones has remarked that Icke may, 
in his opinion, be an agent for the New World Order to undermine the legitimacy of the 
true one-world government conspiracy theories.  However, a number of conspiracy 
theories often have one belief in common: that a tiny, elite group rules the world from 
inside a secret room.  They start wars, elect and fire heads of state, control Hollywood, 
the markets, and the flow of capital.  Anyone who threatens one’s worldview can be 
placed in place of the words “tiny, elite group”; Jews, the President of the United States, 
bankers, or the CIA are all potential conspiracy fodder (Ronson, 2002). 
Although many people show contempt for those who participate in conspiratorial 
thinking because of the sheer implausibility of certain theories, it is safe to say that 
conspiratorial thinking is pervasive in societies all over the world.  A Scripps-Howard 
poll of 1,010 adults in 2006 found that 36% of Americans consider it “very likely” or 
“somewhat likely” that government officials either allowed the September 11th attacks to 
be carried out or carried out the attacks themselves (Time, 2006).  Zonis and Joseph 
(1994) noted a special prevalence of conspiratorial thinking concerning this event among 
Muslims in the Middle East. However, instances of conspiratorial thinking can be found 
concerning just about any major event. For example, there are theories that implicate the 
British secret service in a plot to assassinate Princess Diana of Wales, as well as theories 
which state that Diana herself staged her death so that she and Dodi Fayed could retreat 
into isolation (LondonNet, 2005).    
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The popularity of conspiracy theories often grows with time, as well as becoming 
more elaborate (McHoskey, 1995). A national 1992 survey by the New York Times 
showed that a mere 10% of Americans believed the official account that Lee Harvey 
Oswald acted alone in assassinating President John F. Kennedy, while 77% believed that 
others were involved.   In 1996, 36% of the respondents in a Gallup poll believed that 
Oswald acted alone.  The percentage was 11% in both the 1976 and 1983 Gallup polls, 
and 13% in a 1988 CBS poll (New York Times, 1992).  This increase in belief has 
occurred despite the fact that evidence has accumulated which increasingly shows 
support for the lone-assassin theory. 
But why should social science care about conspiratorial thinking?  What does it 
matter if a certain percentage of the population wants to believe alternative version of an 
event?  Unfortunately there are some real-world consequences for these beliefs.  Beliefs 
lead to behavior, so it would stand to reason that those who believe in conspiracy theories 
would behave differently in certain situations than their skeptical counterparts. 
A study by Bogart and Thorburn (2004) suggested that African-American men 
who held stronger HIV/AIDS conspiracy beliefs had more negative attitudes about 
condoms and were less likely to use condoms consistently.  Given the disproportionally 
high prevalence rates of HIV and AIDS among African-Americans, any barrier to 
prevention is crucial in the design of effective interventions (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2002).  If African-American males are less likely to use condoms 
consistently, that makes not just one, but two individuals susceptible to HIV/AIDS, not to 
mention an array of other sexually transmitted infections.  This suggests that government 
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and public health entities need to work toward obtaining the trust of African-American 
communities and acknowledging the origin of conspiracy beliefs in the context of 
historical discrimination. 
Opinion polls of the international community have suggested that there is not a 
consensus on who carried out the September 11th attacks.  An international poll 
(WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008) of 17 countries revealed that majorities in only nine of 
them believed that al-Qaeda was behind the attacks.  This included European countries 
such as France, Germany, Italy, and England.  Populations in the Middle East were 
especially likely to name a perpetrator other than al-Qaeda.  
Another example of belief in conspiracy theories leading to antisocial behavior is 
the case of a 36-year-old computer programmer named John Patrick Bedell.  On 
Thursday, March 4th at approximately 6 pm, Bedell walked to the entrance of the 
Pentagon and pulled out two nine millimeter semiautomatic weapons and opened fire on 
officers Jeffrey Amos and Marvin Carraway, wounding them both.  After an 
investigation, it was discovered that Bedell had previously picked up a conspiracy theory 
about an alleged murder in 1991 of Marine Col. James Sabow, who was found dead at his 
home in what authorities ruled a suicide.  Conspiracy theorists suggest that this was 
actually a murder at the hands of the federal government and the case is a cover up.  
Bedell posted on the internet that exposing the truth behind the Sabow case would be a 
“step toward establishing the truth of events such as the September 11 demolition” (New 
York Times, 2010). 
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The fact that so many individuals seem to accept conspiratorial thinking has led 
me to believe that such thinking is a generalized ideological trait bred from not only the 
individual, but the situation and context in which the conspiratorial belief is held.  I 
believe that Terror Management Theory, aspects of Kruglanski’s theory of lay 
epistemology, and the ideology of both the believer and conspiracy could be part of the 
equation. 
Terror Management Theory 
In answering these queries, I believe Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) provides a 
complementary perspective on the belief structures of individuals who believe in 
conspiracies by positing that structured representations of social information are 
important for maintaining an anxiety-buffer against deeply rooted fears about death.  
Terror Management Theory [TMT] is based on the assumption that although humans 
share with all living organisms systems for serving the goal of continued existence, they 
are unique in their sophisticated symbolic cognitive capabilities.  One of these 
capabilities is self-consciousness. As a by-product of self-consciousness, human beings 
are burdened with the knowledge that their existence will inevitably end and recognize 
that these lethal events cannot be fully anticipated or controlled.  This knowledge, when 
intertwined with a predisposition for survival creates the potential for debilitating terror 
(Landau et al., 2004). 
Humans mitigate the potential for the terror that results from this knowledge by 
developing and subscribing to cultural worldviews.  Cultural worldviews are symbolic 
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conceptions of norms and values shared by members of a group that present a credible 
and security-providing depiction of reality to the acculturated individual.  These 
worldviews serve as anxiety-buffers against the thoughts of one’s mortality by providing 
a meaningful explanation of reality that imbues people’s lives with order, permanence, 
and stability.  The most prominent empirical support for TMT comes from tests of the 
mortality salience [MS] hypothesis, which suggests that heightening the salience of one’s 
mortality should positively intensify diverse cognitive and behavioral efforts to defend or 
bolster central aspects of the individual’s cultural worldview (Greenberg, Solomon, & 
Pyszczynski, 1997). At the same time, it has been suggested that mortality salience 
creates more negative reactions to those who violate their cultural norms and values. 
From a terror management perspective, these negative reactions occur because deviance 
from the norm implies either that the principles of their worldview may not be universally 
valid or that the transgressor is evil. Rather than considering the possibilities that their 
norms and values are invalid, people generally prefer to view transgressors as evil 
(Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). This may explain why 
the antagonists in most conspiracy theories (politicians, political parties, presidential 
administrations, corporate bodies, etc.) could be considered political enemies and are 
elevated to almost super villain status in terms of power and intention.  
Kruglanski’s Theory of Lay Epistemology 
Another comprehensive perspective on the role of social cognitive processes on 
behavior is Kruglanski’s theory of lay epistemology (Kruglanski, 1989, 1990; Kruglanski 
& Webster, 1996).  In depicting how individuals arrive at subjective knowledge, 
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Kruglanski and colleagues proposed a two-stage process of hypothesis generation and 
validation whereby the individual entertains plausible hypotheses about reality and 
evaluates them based on available evidence.  Because gathering and deliberating every 
piece of evidence could continue indefinitely, individuals use a satisficing strategy for 
selecting plausible interpretations that are reasonably consistent with the available 
evidence (Kahneman et al., 1982; Simon, 1983).  Although Kruglanski’s theoretical 
framework acknowledges the role of processing limitations in cessation of hypothesis 
testing, it posits three independent but interacting epistemic motives.  The first is the need 
for nonspecific structure, which refers to people’s desire for an answer on a given topic, 
any answer, as compared to confusion and ambiguity.  The second is the need for specific 
structure, which reflects desires for particular conclusions to meet specific needs of an 
individual, such as conclusions that fit into the individual’s worldview framework.  And 
finally, the activation of these needs for structure motivates an individual to bring the 
inferential process to a close, which leads to “freezing” on the conclusion that best fits the 
information that has been accessed up to that point.  
Neuberg and Newsome (1993) have focused on individual differences in personal 
need for structure (PNS). They suggested that high-PNS individuals are especially prone 
to simplify social information, inhibit open information processing and are more likely to 
close on simple interpretations of social information. Ford and Kruglanski (1995) 
suggested that those individuals classified as dispositionally high in need for structure 
tend to rely more on primed trait constructs when interpreting target information. Thus, 
individuals that are higher on a scale of need for structure could be more susceptible to 
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closing or freezing on information that is flawed, yet consistent with their view of the 
world. This may open the individual to believe conspiracy theories. 
Belief in Conspiracy Theories as a Result 
The compatible theoretical frameworks of Terror Management Theory and 
Kruglanski’s theory of lay epistemology may offer an answer to why people believe in 
conspiracy theories. The two theories share the view that people often prefer definite 
knowledge to a constantly expanding set of hypotheses. TMT also agrees with the lay 
epistemic framework that external factors often induce people to seek epistemically 
satisfying conclusions. One of the benefits of this freezing strategy could be the role it 
plays in maintaining a coherent worldview that buffers people from the implicit 
awareness of their own death. 
It is fairly uncontroversial to suggest that social scientists believe that individuals 
are strongly disposed to organize what would otherwise be an unwieldy amount of 
information into simplified and coherent cognitive models (Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982).  Limited cognitive resources and active goals compel individuals to 
selectively attenuate, comprehend, and schematically structure social information.  This 
is usually done by means of heuristics and selectively attending to certain types of 
information. 
Mortality salience as has been suggested to intensify closure on initial information 
and create a corresponding insensitivity to later conflicting information when forming 
impressions of individuals and events (Landau et al., 2004). From a terror management 
theory perspective, closure gained from freezing on an initial evaluation and ignoring 
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later conflicting information contributes to one’s faith in and orderly and stable reality. 
Landau et al. (2004) suggested that MS intensifies closure on an initial impression and 
creates insensitivity to later conflicting information when forming impressions of social 
events. This phenomenon is called confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is an irrational 
tendency to search for, interpret, or remember information in a way that confirms the 
individual’s preconceptions or working hypothesis (Nickerson, 1998). Studies of social 
judgment also provide evidence that people tend to overweight positive confirmatory 
evidence and underweight negative disconfirmatory evidence. Pyszczynski and 
Greenberg (1987) interpreted such evidence as supportive of the view that people 
generally require less hypothesis-consistent evidence to accept a hypothesis than 
hypothesis-inconsistent information to reject a hypothesis. Individuals who believe in 
conspiracy theories unintentionally use this strategy when fitting the conspiracy theory 
into their general worldview. If a piece of evidence confirms the conspiratorial narrative 
they have created, that piece of evidence will be used to trumpet the infallibility of their 
theory. However, if they come across evidence that contradicts their theory, they will 
either dismiss it or find a reason to decry it as invalid. 
Take, for example, the relative popularity of September 11th conspiracy theories.  
The film “Loose Change,” an immensely popular conspiracy film chronicling the events 
of September 11th, has gone through several different editions, each one attempting to fit 
newly revealed evidence in with the narrative framework of a conspiratorial nature.  
Popular Mechanics (2005) dedicated an entire periodical to debunking several of the 
myths, which resulted in a new edition of the film that attempted to either debunk the 
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scientists who wrote the article or fit each of the pieces of evidence the scientists gave 
into the framework of the Bush administration destroying the buildings themselves.  The 
directors and editors of the film use clips that aired on news stations on the day of 
September 11th to back up their claims.  Interviews with witnesses who say they heard 
“what sounded like missiles” colliding with the towers are used to bolster the idea that 
the government essentially attacked itself. 
Mortality salience has also been suggested to exaggerate reliance on 
representative information. Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1996) proposed that people 
tend to overlook objective statistical evidence in forming group membership judgments 
and rely more on representative information, such that others are assumed to belong to 
certain categories to the extent that they represent the category stereotype. From a terror 
management perspective, representative information allows the categorization of others 
into neat and stable groups, thereby reinforcing the categories that partially constitute 
one’s worldview and viewing those who oppose their worldview more negatively. Most 
conspiracies in some way or another define the actors within a conspiracy as “good guys” 
and “bad guys”. “Good guys” are fighting for the truth, while “bad guys” are suppressing 
the truth in order to promote or profit off of their lies. Individuals who have their 
mortality primed may be significantly more likely to do this and inadvertently create a 
situation in which they are more likely to ascribe a conspiracy theory as an explanation of 
an event. 
 The relative popularity of the myth that vaccinations cause autism is another 
example. In 1998, Andrew Wakefield, a British gastroenterologist with a history of self-
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promotion, published a paper that alleged that the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine caused 
autism. It was a claim that resonated with parents who brought their child in for 
immunizations only to find that the next few years were marked with severe social 
deficits and lack of communication. Parents felt helpless, watching the child they raised 
retreat into their own little world, and they were never given a satisfactory explanation as 
to why. After the media took hold of the Wakefield’s story, parents of children with 
autism spectrum disorders suddenly had a ray of hope disguised as a conspiracy theory. 
According to Dr. Wakefield, children all over the world were being put in harm’s way 
because cowed governments, powerful business and pharmaceutical interests, mercenary 
scientists and journalists collectively suppressed the truth in order to increase profits 
(Mnookin, 2011). 
 According to my model of conspiracy belief, it could be conjectured that the 
parents had to face a medical decision that had significant bearing on the life or death of 
their child: vaccination. If they vaccinate their children, the child may retreat within and 
become unresponsive; if they did not vaccinate their child it would leave them vulnerable 
to life-threatening diseases. Once parents had an “expert” that empathized with their 
situation it is no surprise that the idea took hold. Andrew Wakefield reinforced the 
parents’ view that vaccinations cause autism, and in doing so invariably exaggerated the 
status and expertise of this individual. He also gave parents a list of antagonists to their 
worldview in which denigrate for their child’s condition: pharmaceutical companies, 
governments, and science. The vaccines cause autism, he claimed, and these big 
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industries were standing in the way of their child’s long, healthy life because they wanted 
to rake in millions from government funded vaccination programs. 
 The purpose of the present study is to assess the degree to which conspiratorial 
thinking is a function of mortality salience, political affiliation, and conspiracy ideology. 
Students with either conservative or liberal worldviews will be asked to evaluate ten 
articles, four of which will describe conspiracy theories. Two of the target articles will 
describe theories consistent with a liberal worldview and the other two will describe 
theories consistent with a conservative worldview. Half of the participants will undergo a 
mortality salience manipulation while the other half will not. It is predicted that those 
participants receiving the mortality salience manipulation will show an increased 
tendency to believe conspiracies that fit their political ideology and a decreased tendency 
to believe conspiracies opposed to their ideology. It is also predicted that individuals who 
are primed with thoughts of their own death in the mortality salience condition will be 
more susceptible to believe the articles than those in the control condition. 
Method 
Participants 
 The participants were 109 individuals of voting age (50 conservative, 59 liberal) 
recruited through e-mail requests sent to various political organizations and student 
political organizations. Participants were randomly assigned to the mortality salience 
condition and a control condition in which they were asked to write about the thoughts 
that come to mind when they think about dental pain. 
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Materials and Procedure 
 The study was conducted using an online survey where the participants were told 
that they were taking part in an experiment on how people read and understand events. 
Once the experiment began, subjects filled out a packet of questionnaires. The packet 
contained the Personal Need for Structure Scale, the Personal Need for Closure Scale, 
and the Adult Attachment scale as filler items. They were also asked to state their 
political preference (liberal or conservative), which was used to determine their 
worldview. The mortality salience treatment (MS) treatment immediately followed the 
questionnaires. It involved participants responding to two open-ended items: “Please 
briefly describe the thoughts and emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in 
you” and “jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you 
physically die and once you are physically dead.” In order to control for the possibility 
that the effect of this induction is a reaction to reminders of any adverse experience, 
participants in the control condition were given a parallel questionnaire with regard to 
their feelings concerning dental pain. 
 Participants then completed a word jumble task consisting of 10 neutral words as 
a delay and distraction before the dependent measure. This was done because MS effects 
have been found to be strongest after a short period of delay when death-related thoughts 
are out of focal attention (Greenberg et al., 1994). 
 After the participants completed the distraction task, they read ten articles in total. 
Six of these articles were regular articles. The other four articles described conspiracy 
theories. Two of the conspiracy stories presented conspiracies consistent with a liberal 
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worldview, while two presented stories consistent with a conservative worldview. 
Articles that were categorized as “conservative conspiracies” were articles that were 
believed to be in line with a conservative’s worldview. In other words, a “conservative 
conspiracy” was a conspiracy that a conservative person should find believable, where as 
a “liberal conspiracy” was one that a liberal person should find believable. Each 
participant received the packet of ten articles in a randomized order. The six control 
articles covered general topics involving the United States. They concerned Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society, the U.S. Constitution, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
The Iran Hostage Crisis, the first Gulf War, and Rosa Parks. The first target article that fit 
within a liberal worldview described the Project for the New American Century (a 
neoconservative think-tank) and their efforts to create a one-world government based on 
right wing conservative principles. The second liberal target article described a 
conspiracy that states that the oil companies’ theory of “peak oil” is a farce determined 
by oil companies, giving them the leverage to gouge customers. The first conservative 
target article described how the global warming “industry” invented and perpetuated the 
view that anthropogenic global warming is occurring in order to gain large grant funds 
and make people less apprehensive about being taxed. The second conservative target 
article described how President Barack Obama kept the death of Osama bin Laden a 
secret in order to perpetrate a sort of “October surprise” due to his flailing popularity 
numbers. 
 Participants were asked to respond to three multiple-choice questions about each 
article they read. They were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 6 how clear and concise the 
15 
 
	  
writing was and how much the participants believed the information contained within the 
article. For a participant to completely believe a story, they would mark it a 6. If they 
were to consider the story to be completely fabricated, they would mark it a 1. The 
participants were instructed to complete the materials at their own pace. They were fully 
debriefed upon completion.  
Results 
Participants’ ratings of the believability were averaged over the two liberal and 
two conservative articles to form a believability index for each type of article.  The 
believability scores were subjected to a 2 (mortality salience) x 2 (participant ideology) x 
2 (article ideology) analysis of variance.  Results showed a significant main effect of type 
of article (Liberal vs. Conservative), F(1, 105) = 12.32, p < .001, partial η2 = .11, with 
liberal articles (M = 4.62) being rated more believable than conservative articles (M = 
4.05).  The main effect of participant ideology (Liberal vs. Conservative) was also 
significant, F(1, 105) = 5.66, p < .02, partial η2 = .05, showing conservatives found the 
articles more believable (M = 4.72) than did liberals (M = 4.00).  The main effect of 
mortality salience was not significant, F(1, 105) = 1.05, p = .31, partial η2 = .01. 
The analysis also showed that all three two-way interactions were significant: 
type of article by ideology, F(1, 105) = 19.67, p < .001, partial η2 = .16; mortality 
salience by ideology, F(1, 105) = 5.66, p < .02, partial η2 = .05; and mortality salience by 
type of article, F(1, 105) = 5.65, p < .02, partial η2 = .05. Bonferoni corrected post hoc 
tests showed that liberals differed from conservatives in their ratings of believability for 
the conservative articles (liberal M = 3.39, conservative M = 4.82) but did not differ from 
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conservatives in their ratings of the liberal articles (liberal M = 4.62, conservative M = 
4.63).  These tests also showed that liberals (MS M = 4.49, control M = 3.52) were more 
influenced than conservatives (MS M = 4.50, control M = 4.89) by the mortality salience 
manipulation.  Finally, post hoc tests also showed that mortality salience only influenced 
believability ratings for the liberal articles (MS M = 5.02, control M = 4.29).  Mortality 
salience had no effect on believability ratings for the conservative articles (MS M = 3.98, 
control M = 4.10).   
Although the three-way interaction did not reach significance, F(1, 105) = .28, p = 
.60, partial η2 = .003, further exploration of the data suggests that the two-way 
interactions involving mortality salience were largely a function of the fact mortality 
salience only seemed to influence liberal participants’ ratings of liberal articles.  As can 
be seen in Table 1, conservative participants were non-significantly less likely to believe 
both liberal and conservative articles when their mortality was made salient. Liberal 
participants’ believability ratings tended to go up when mortality was made salient, but 
this increase was only significant for liberal articles.   
Table 1. The Effects of Mortality Salience on Believability Ratings Partitioned by Ideology and  
Type of Article 
 
Participant Article MS Mean Control Mean t value p value 
Conservative  Conservative 4.43 5.10 -.19 .85 
 Liberal 4.57 4.67 -1.29 .21 
Liberal Conservative  3.65 3.13 1.39 .17 
 Liberal 5.35 3.91 3.44 .001 
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Discussion 
 The present study attempted to demonstrate the moderating role of mortality 
salience on the relation between participant ideology, article ideology and the perceived 
believability of conspiracy theories.  It was hypothesized that participants of either 
political ideology in the mortality salience condition would be more likely to believe 
articles proposing conspiracy theories, specifically when their ideology and the article’s 
ideology matched. The findings did not support this hypothesis. Interestingly, participants 
who identified as conservative were more likely to believe the conspiracies overall, while 
liberals only showed increased believability in the liberal articles in the mortality salience 
condition.  Thus, the behavior of liberal participants tended to match predictions while 
conservative participants were not influenced by mortality salience.  Reading liberal 
conspiracies were the only group that followed the expected trend.  
 In addition to our predictions, we found that for the particular articles used, the 
liberal articles tended to be more believable.  In addition, conservatives were generally 
more likely to believe the articles than were liberals.  Thus, it appears that conservatives 
paid very little attention to the ideological position expressed in the article and were 
simply more likely to believe the conspiracy theories.  An interesting, and 
counterintuitive finding was that conspiracy theories oriented in a liberal direction were 
generally believed more than conspiracy theories oriented in a conservative direction. 
Despite these interesting results, there are numerous limitations to the present 
study. First, the articles may not have been accurately representing the intended 
worldview. The variables of a “liberal,” “conservative,” “liberal conspiracy,” and 
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“conservative conspiracy” can be used more generally in the real world than was used in 
the present study, especially considering the targets in the conspiracy articles. Political 
affiliation was used broadly in the present study, even though there are several different 
types of “liberals” and “conservatives”. For example, it is possible that self-described 
liberals can have reservations about the theory of global warming and were conflicted 
about how to answer the question of believability.  
Another limitation to the present study is the possibility that the conspiracies just 
did not align with the political affiliation they were thought to be. For example, someone 
with a conservative worldview may reject the theory of “peak oil” due to reasons that are 
not encapsulated in the target article. It is entirely conceivable that a liberal could feel the 
same way about “big oil”. The frustrations experienced between citizens and corporations 
could potentially cross political parties. Instead of having individuals self-describe their 
political beliefs, perhaps they should have rated their liking of different possible target 
corporations, companies or politicians to compare to their believability ratings. 
Although my hypotheses were only partially supported, the results suggest some 
directions for future research. First, it might be worthwhile to explore whether 
conservatives would always find any conspiracy associated with centralized government 
more believable.  One aspect of current conservative notions in the U.S. is that 
government is “too big” and is trying to control too many aspects of everyday life.  This 
general belief may lead conservatives to distrust government and, thus, more likely to 
believe any conspiracy theory involving government.  Thus, future research should use a 
wider variety of conspiracy theories that do and do not involve government as part of the 
19 
 
	  
theory.  It might also be interesting to assess whether other types of “irrational” beliefs 
are associated with beliefs in conspiracy theories, or if such theories hold a unique place 
in the belief structures of those people who find tent to find them convincing.  There are 
many avenues for research in this area and I hope these results lead researchers to 
consider following some of these avenues. 
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